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    INTRODUCTION 
    One of the questions that has generated most 
interest in the last decade is the role that pragmatic 
knowledge has in the reasoning process (see Valiña, 
1996, for a revision of the theoretical approaches 
towards pragmatic reasoning).  
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    The objective of this experiment is, precisely, to 
determine in what way the subjects' knowledge of 
the real world modulates their performance in a 
conditional reasoning task. 
    In a previous experiment, carried out by the 
authors, the subjects were presented with the three 
versions of Wason's selection task (Wason, 1966, 
1968), with three types of content (abstract, 
thematic-permission and thematic-obligation). The 
results of this experiment showed the importance of 
factors related to knowledge in executing a 
metainference task, such as the task of selecting four 
cards. Indeed, this effect cannot be understood as a 
mere facilitation of concrete content, faced with the 
abstract content of the rule. In fact, a better 
performance was registered in the versions which 
included a deontic relation, both in abstract and 
thematic content. Besides, the worst  results were 
obtained with the rule, with a thematic content, 
 
 
which expressed a relation of possibility. 
    This improvement in reasoning could be 
explained by the proposals of the Theory of 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & 
Oliver, 1986; Holyoak and Cheng, 1995). From this 
perspective, in the two tasks which register a higher 
number of correct answers, the subjects would be 
using a schema similar to that of "Obligation". 
However, it is difficult to explain other results by 
way of this theoretical proposal, such as the 
differences in performance registered between the 
two thematic versions, with both being similar to a 
pragmatic schema, either of obligation ("thematic-
2") or of permission ("thematic-1"). 
    However, using the Theory of Mental Models 
(Johnson-Laird 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 
1991), it is possible to predict and explain the 
differences in performance between conditionals 
 
 
which express a deontic relation, of “necessity” and 
conditionals which present a mere “possibility”. In 
this respect, as Johnson-Laird and Byrne indicated 
(1992; Byrne and Johnson-Laird, 1992), the 
“deontic framework” or “epistemic” of the 
conditional relation may be modulating the subjects' 
reasoning. 
    Also, the results of Valiña and colleagues (1996) 
only allow us to verify the influence of the character 
of “necessity” of a conditional relation, when the 
subjects are reasoning about a metainference task, such 
as the selection task. However, is this an influence that 
may be generalised to other conditional inference 
tasks?. We designed this experiment to answer this 
question. 
    Our interest in this experiment is not, therefore, to 
analyse the influence of the content (abstract vs. 
thematic) on the subjects' conditional reasoning, as this 
has been dealt with previously by the authors (Seoane 
 
 
and Valiña, 1988). In fact, we only used conditional 
arguments, with thematic content, as experimental 
material. In our opinion, questions relating to the 
possible effect of thematic facilitation have 
generated abundant experimental investigation in the 
last twenty years, but is now a theme that is practically 
exhausted, given that, as we previously indicated, 
the influence of knowledge on pragmatic reasoning 
is more complex than that of a mere facilitation of 
thematic versus abstract content. 
    In this experiment we tried to determine, precisely, 
the importance of the variable which we refer to as 
“the probability of empirical frequency” on 
conditional reasoning (see Valiña and colleagues, 
1992a, b). This refers to the frequency with which 
the expressed relation between antecedent and 
consequent in conditional statements, occurs in the real 
world. This offers three levels, which refer to the 
grade of empirical occurrence: “deterministic”, 
 
 
“probabilistic” and “without relation”. In this 
respect, we consider the deterministic relation 
similar to a relation of “empirical necessity” (the 
relation expressed in the conditional statement 
always happens), while the “probabilistic” relation 
presents a character of “empirical possibility” 
(which only happens sometimes in the real world). 
    If, as is proposed from the theory of mental 
models, subjects reason by elaborating analogical 
representations of the real world, it would be 
expected that reasoning with conditional statements 
in which “empirical  possibilities” are expressed will 
be different from the reasoning involved with 
statements which imply “empirical necessities”. More 
precisely, and in agreement with Johnson-Laird's 
proposals (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1992; Byrne 
and Johnson-Laird, 1992), reasoning about a 
“necessary” argument requires the elaboration of a 
unique, explicit mental model of the situation. 
 
 
However, if the situation is of a “probable” 
conditional statement, that may or may not occur in 
the real world, then it would be necessary to elaborate 
an explicit mental model and an implicit model. It may 
therefore be expected that the subjects will manifest 
more correct reasoning with conditional statements, 
that they express a necessary (deterministic) 
relation, than if the relation is possible 
(probabilistic). In the latter case the number of 
mental models necessary to produce the conclusion 
will be greater, which will lead to an increase in the 
load on operative memory, and will definitively 
mean an increase in the number of errors. 
 
    We have also manipulated another two variables: 
the “type of conditional rule” and the “availability”. 
The first offers four levels which correspond  to the 
four  types of conditional inference rules proposed 
by propositional logic. 
    The manipulation of the “type of rule” variable 
 
 
will allow us to check how our results support the 
predictions of the theory of mental models (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson- Laird & Byrne, 1991), or those 
of its revised version (Evans, 1993), developed within 
the framework of Evan's theory of heuristic-
analytical processes. 
    Based on the theory of mental models, the 
following is predictable: 1) the Modus Ponens rule is 
produced more often than Modus Tollens, 2) Modus 
Ponens and the rule of Affirmation of the 
Consequent will occur with the same frequency, 3) 
the rule of Affirmation of the Consequent will be 
produced more often than the rule of Denial of 
Antecedent, and 4) the rules of Modus Ponens and 
Affirmation of Consequent will be more frequent 
than those of Modus Tollens and Denial of 
Antecedent. 
    Evans (1993) indicated that the predictions 
offered by Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson- Laird & 
 
 
Byrne, 1991) do not always fit the data. He 
developed  a “revised  version” of the theory of 
mental models, with the intention of being able to 
explain some of the empirical results registered in 
experimental investigation about conditional 
inference, that are not justified by the original 
version of the theory of mental models. Some of the 
empirical predictions proposed by Evans, with 
regard to the generation of the four modalities of 
conditional inference, coincide with or differ from 
those proposed by Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991). These are the following: 1) 
The MP rule is produced more frequently than MT, 
2) the MP rule is generated more often, being even 
more frequent than the AC rule, 3) the AC and DA 
rules will occur with approximately the same 
frequency, and 4) the MP and AC rules will occur 
more often than those of MT and DA. 
    Finally, the third variable manipulated was 
 
 
the“availability”. Our objective is to study up to what 
point the accessibility of a scenario is a sufficient 
condition (as proposed by Pollard, 1982) to provoke 
an improvement in subjects' reasoning, or if, as 
Evans proposed (1984, 1989), it may be a necessary 
condition, but not enough so to influence reasoning. 
    Based on our theoretical proposals, we conceive 
the following empirical expectations: 
 1. We consider that the reasoning process is 
modulated by factors related to the subjects' previous 
knowledge. In this respect, the greater the possibility 
of activating knowledge by the subjects, the easier 
the task will be. As Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1992; 
Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1992) proposed, reasoning 
from a deontic relation implies the elaboration of a 
unique mental model. Consequently, we hope to 
obtain the highest number of correct answers and 
greatest certainty of answer when the subjects reason 
about “deterministic” statements. In the same way, 
 
 
the worst performance and lowest levels of certainty 
will be registered in statements “without relation”,  
where it is not possible to access the subjects' 
conceptual system. 
    2. In our opinion, the subjects reason by 
elaborating mental models or scenarios of the 
situation. However, the use of accessible scenarios 
is not enough to improve performance in a reasoning 
task. In this respect and bearing in mind that the 
availability of the scenario presented was limited to 
including available professions in decontextualised 
arguments, we do not expect to register significant 
principal effects of this variable on the number of 
correct answers. More specifically, we do not expect 
better performance when the subjects reason about 
arguments which include available professions, 





    3. We consider that availability, in itself, is not a 
sufficient factor to improve performance, and agree 
with Pollard and Evan's proposal (1987) when they 
indicate that variables of content-context are those 
which modulate human reasoning. In this respect, 
we expect to register lower number of correct 
answers and less certainty of answer when the 
probability of empirical occurrence expressed in the 
arguments is null (“without relation” condition), if 
the subjects reason about non-available scenarios. 
Also, subjects will tend to reject the task more often 
(which will be reflected in the increase in the 
percentage of selections of the non-propositional 
alternative). However, when the subjects reason about 
deterministic statements presented in available 
contexts, we expect to register the highest number of 
correct answers and greatest certainty of answer. 
Here, access to the conceptual system is being 
facilitated, and the activation of relevant knowledge 
will definitively facilitate the elaboration of a mental 
 
 
framework to reason about. 
 
 
    EXPERIMENT 
    Method 
   Subjects 
    54 college students participated voluntarily in this 
experiment (26 females and 28 males, average age 17 
years 6 months), from La Coruña, Spain. 
   Design 
   
    A 3 x 2 x 4 design was used (probability of 
occurrence in the real world x availability x type of 
rule), with repeated measurements in the three factors. 
   The first factor manipulated was probability of 
empirical occurrence of the relation expressed 
between the antecedent and the consequent of each 
conditional statement. This relation could occur 
always in the real world (deterministic), sometimes 
 
 
(probabilistic) or there could be no specific relation 
between antecedent and consequent (without 
relation). 
 
    The second factor was Availability, with two levels 
(Available and Non-Available). This refers to the type 
of profession included in the problem, that in one 
case was available for the subjects (for example, a 
singer), while in the other case it was non-available 
(for example, a soprano). 
    Finally, the third factor was the Type of Rule, 
which corresponds to the four types of conditional 
inference, proposed by propositional logic: Modus 
Ponens (MP), Modus Tollens (MT), Affirmation of 
the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent 
(DA). 
    As Dependent Variables, we used the Number of 
Correct Answers according to logic and Certainty 





    Materials and Procedure 
    Two booklets were used, produced by ourselves. 
Each contained one page of instructions and a total 
of 48 problems of conditional inference (two on each 
page). 16 of them expressed deterministic relations, 
which always occur in the real world (for example, 
"if the nun looks at herself in the mirror, then she 
sees herself reflected"), 16 contained statements 
which happen sometimes, or probabilistic (for 
example, "if the miner smokes a lot, then he will have 
lung cancer") and, finally, 16 items which contained 
conditional statements where there is no specific 
relation between the antecedent and the consequent 
(for example, "if the sculptor cuts his hair, then he 
will get married"). The conditional statements were 
taken from a previous normative study, elaborated 




    The degree of availability of the content was 
manipulated, selecting the professions of the people in 
it, that were included in the premises. These people 
could have an available profession for the subjects (for 
example, "if the workman falls from the tenth floor he 
will hurt himself), while in the other eight items a non-
available profession was presented (for example,"if the 
plasterer falls from the tenth floor, then he will hurt 
himself). 
    We have used with conditional arguments,  people 
with available professions (eg. singer, clown, 
philosopher, biologist, workman etc.), and non-
available (eg. soprano, axiologist, tightrope walker, 
malacologist, plasterer, etc.), selected from a 
previous standardising study carried out by one of the 
authors. In previous studies these had been used in a 
series of experiments based upon the study of 
syllogistic reasoning, with quantifiers of natural 
language, including syllogisms in narrative texts 
 
 
(Valiña 1985, 1988; Valiña & De Vega, 1988). 
    Finally, two problems of each rule of propositional 
logic were included for both types of content (2 Modus 
Ponens, 2 Modus Tollens, 2 Affirmation of the 
Consequent, and 2 Denial of the Antecedent). 
    The problems were randomised and their order of 
presentation in the booklets was random and inverse 
random. 
    The experimental paradigm used was an answer 
selection paradigm. The task the subjects faced was to 
select the conclusion that was logically deduced from 
the premises. Also, they had to mark with a cross in a 
seven point scale, the degree of certainty that they had 
in the correction of their choice. This scale went from 
"not at all certain" to "completely certain", with an 
intermediate step for "undecided". 
    The experiment was carried out in a single experimental 
session, in the class where the students normally have 
 
 
lessons. Half of the subjects, randomly selected, 
received the booklet with the items presented in 
random order, and the other half received another 
booklet with the items in inverse random order. 
 
    Once the instructions had been read out loud and any 
problems resolved, the subjects carried out the task 
without a time limit. 
 
   RESULTS 
    The data from 6 subjects was eliminated for carrying 
out the analysis as they had not completed the task. 
 
     A) Type of Answer 
    The paradigm used in this experiment was, as 
previously noted, an answer selection paradigm. The 
task was to select the conclusion or conclusions that 
they considered possible to logically deduce from the 
premises. Three conclusions were presented for each 
item. The “type 1" answer corresponded to the 
 
 
affirmative conclusion, “ type 2" to the negative 
conclusion and "type 3" to the non-propositional, 
meaning it was not possible to deduce any conclusion.  
    In relation to the percentage of subjects who selected 
each of the three possible alternatives for each type 
of rule, in each experimental condition, the most 
frequently selected answer in the Modus Ponens rule 
was the affirmative conclusion, which is logically 
correct. This percentage is reduced in line with the 
probability of empirical occurrence between 
antecedent and consequent of the conditional 
statement. More precisely, the highest percentages of 
selection of the correct answer was registered in the 
“deterministic” condition, while a lower frequency 
of selection of the correct answer appeared in the 
“without relation” condition. In this case, the 
subjects were not able to establish any particular link 
between the events mentioned in the rule and the real 
world. A higher frequency of rejection of the 
 
 
problem was registered in this task, which is reflected 
in an increase in the selection of the non-propositional 
alternative. 
    In the case of the Modus Tollens  rule,  the  most  
selected  answer  was  the conclusion which in this 
case is correct. However, the percentage of subjects 
who reached the logically correct answer is less than 
in the Modus Ponens rule. Despite this, the decreasing 
progression remains the same, throughout the three 
conditions of empirical occurrence: deterministic-
probabilistic-without relation. Therefore, in Modus 
Tollens the deterministic condition is also that 
which registered a greater percentage of subjects 
who selected the correct answer, followed by the 
probabilistic condition. Nonetheless, the percentage 
of subjects who selected the non-propositional 
alternative increased with the problems of the 
“without relation” condition. This increase is greater 
than that registered in the same condition with the 
Modus Ponens rule. 
 
 
    Accordingly, the correct answer is that which is 
selected most with the Modus Ponens and Modus 
Tollens rules, in agreement with the criteria of formal 
logic (an affirmative conclusion for MP and a 
negative conclusion for MT). 
    In the rules of Affirmation of the Consequent and 
Denial of the Antecedent, the condition where the 
greatest percentage of correct selections occurs 
("type 3" answer) was in “without relation”. 
However, when the empirical occurrence was 
deterministic or probabilistic, there was an increase 
in the tendency to make biconditional interpretations 
of the statement, which was reflected in an increase 
of the selection of “type 1” and “type 2” answers, 
respectively. 
    Therefore, when the subjects reasoned about AC 
or DA rules, where there was no empirical relation 
between the antecedent and the consequent, they 
mainly selected the answer that showed that no 
 
 
conclusion could be deduced from the premises, 
being the correct alternative, according to logic. 
However, when the statement expressed a 
deterministic or probabilistic empirical relation, there 
were differences between both rules (AC and DA) 
with regard to the type of answer most frequently 
selected. When the subjects had to reason about AC 
problems, they most frequently selected the “type l” 
answer, while with DA problems they mainly tended 
to select “type 2”. This may indicate that the increase 
in the empirical frequency of the content of the rules 
is accompanied by an increase in the subjects' 
tendency to carry out biconditional interpretations of 
the premises, while in the case of conditions 
“without relation”, this tendency is "blocked", and as 
a consequence the subjects considered that it was not 
possible to deduce any conclusion. Indeed, it is 
precisely the choice of this answer in the “without 
relation” condition which raises the percentage of 
correct answers with AC and DA rules. 
 
 
    In relation to the percentage of subjects who 
selected the “type 3” answer ("no conclusion 
deduced") was greater in the non-logical rules than 
in the logical rules. In turn, this alternative was that 
which was most selected when the subjects reasoned 
about statements where there was no relation 
between their elements. 
 
 
B) Number of Correct Answers 
 
    The number of correct answers which each subject 
had in his booklet was added up, following the criteria 
of formal logic.  
    An ANOVA 3 x 2 x 4 was made (probability of 
occurrence x availability x type of rule), using the 
number of correct answers as a dependent variable. 
In this analysis a significant effect was registered of 
the type of rule variable (F(l.64, 77.26)=14.14; p< 
.0001;  =.54797), with relation to the number of 
correct answers. The highest number of correct answers 
 
 
were registered when the subjects reasoned about 
Modus Ponens problems (MP=82.82%), followed by 
those obtained with Modus Tollens problems 
(MMT=62.85%) and Denial of the Antecedent 
(MDA=50.86%). Finally, the lowest percentages of 
logical successes were obtained with Affirmation of 
the Consequent problems (MAC=43.23%). The 
corresponding contrasts carried out afterwards 
indicated that there were significant differences in the 
selection of correct answers between Modus Ponens 
and Modus Tollens (t=19.14; p<.0001), as well as 
between these two rules with regard to the Affinnation 
of the Consequent rule (t= 18.465; p<.001). However, 
no significant differences were registered between the 
number of correct answers with the Affirmation of the 
Consequent and Denial of the Antecedent rules. 
 
    Similarly, a significant interactive effect was 
registered between probability of empirical occurrence 
x type of rule (F(3.58, 168.42); p< .0001; =  .59724). 
 
 
As may be seen in Figure 1, with the Modus Ponens 
rule, when a deterministic relation was presented, the 
highest number of correct answers was obtained. 
Specifically, the following decreasing progression was 
registered in the number of logically correct answers, 
between experimental conditions: deterministic 
(96.35%), probabilistic (81.25%) and without relation 
(70.85%). 
    The same progression is maintained with the Modus 
Tollens rule, even if the number of correct answers in 
the three levels of empirical occurrence is lower than in 
the MP rule (70.33% - 62.5% - 55.73%, respectively). 
However, in the rules of Affirmation of the Consequent 
and Denial of the Antecedent, this progression was 
different. More specifically, in the Affirmation of the 
Consequent rule, the decreasing progression with regard 
to the number of correct answers was the following: 
without relation (54.18%), deterministic (38.53%) and 
probabilistic (36.98%). The Denial of the Antecedent 
 
 
rule followed the same progression, although higher 
number of correct answers was registered than in the 
AC rule: without relation (60.93%) - deterministic 
(46.35%) - probabilistic (45.30%).  
    ANOVAs  3 x 2 x 2 were also carried out in both, in 
which the two first variables were the same factors of 
analysis that have been referred to (probability of 
empirical occurrence x availability), while the third 
variable only had two levels, which corresponded 
either to the two “types of logical rules” or with the two 





    B.l. Number of correct answers (logical 
rules) 
    The results of the ANOVAS 3 x 2 x 2 (probability of 
 
 
empirical occurrence x availability x logical rule) 
indicated that the probability of empirical occurrence 
significantly influenced this dependent variable 
(F(2,46)=9.894; p<.0001). There were significant 
differences between the deterministic condition, where 
the highest levels of correct answers were registered, 
and the other two (t = 19.638; p< .0001). 
    Significant differences were also obtained in the 
type of logical rule variable  (F(l,47 )= 16.49; p < .0001). 
Specifically, when the subjects reasoned about Modus 
Ponens rules, the percentage of correct answers was 
higher (82.82%) than when they reasoned about 
Modus Tollens rules (63.89%).   
 
    B.2. Number of Correct Answers (non-logical rules) 
    The results of ANOVAs, where the number of 
correct answers in non-logical rules was considered as 
a variable, once again showed that the probability of 
empirical occurrence significantly influences the 
 
 
number of logically correct answers (F(l.39, 65.38; p < 
.04;  =.659). When the subjects reasoned about 
statements without a relation between their elements, 
they offered a higher number of correct answers 
(57.55%), and the lowest percentage appeared when 
they reasoned about probabilistic statements (41.14%). 
Later contrasts showed significant differences between 
the "without relation" condition and the other two (t= 
2.661; p< .028). 
 
The type of non-logical rule also significantly 
influenced this dependent variable (F(l ,47)= 5.05; p < 
.029), with a higher percentage of correct answers 
being registered with the Denial of the Antecedent rule 




    The subjects had to indicate for each of the items the 
certainty with which they selected the conclusion 
 
 
which, in their opinion, could be deduced from the 
premises. Each one of the answers was marked on a 
scale which went from l (not at all certain) to 7 
(completely certain). 
    An ANOVA 3 x 2 x 4 was made (probability of 
empirical occurrence x availability x type of rule). In 
this case, differences with regard to availability were 
registered. The subjects appeared more certain about 
the correction of their answer, when they reasoned 
about available content (MAv=6.21), than when they 
did so with non-available content (MNon-Av=6.13). 
Despite the fact that the values of the averages 
between both conditions appeared to be 
undetectable, the results of the analyses indicate that 
the differences were statistically significant 
(F(l,47)= 4.96; p< .031). 
    Similarly, as with the number of correct answers, 
significant differences were registered in certainty of 
answer with regard to  the  type  of  rule variable  
 
 
(F(2.70,  126.67)= 11.48; p< .0001; = .898). Once 
the corresponding contrasts were carried out 
afterwards, significant differences were noticed 
between the MP rule with relation to MT (t= 17.45; 
p<.0001), so that the subjects feel more confident 
with their answers when they reasoned about Modus 
Ponens problems than with Modus Tollens rules. 
Furthermore, the subjects were more confident when 
they reasoned about any of these arguments (MP and 
MT) than with arguments of Affirmation of the 
Consequent (t = 10.991; p<.002). Finally, there were 
significant differences in the certainty of answer 
when the subjects reasoned about MP, MT and AC 
rules compared to Denial of the Antecedent rules (t 
= 7.677; p< .001). 
    The probability of empirical occurrence also 
significantly influenced the certainty of answer (F(l.44, 
67.63) = 5.17; p< .015; = .719). When the subjects 
reasoned about deterministic statements, meaning 
that they always happened in the real world, they 
 
 
showed themselves to be more certain about their 
answers (MDET=6.27) than when they reasoned about 
statements that only occur with certain frequency, or 
that were probabilistic (MPROB=6.18). Finally, 
arguments where there is no empirical relation 
between antecedent and consequent are those which 
provoked less certainty in the subjects' reasoning 
(MWR=6.06). Subsequent contrasts showed 
differences in the deterministic condition compared 
to the other two (t = 6.533; p< .014). 
 
    DISCUSSION 
 
    Significant differences were registered in the 
number of correct answers, with  regard to the type 
of rule. Correct performance resulted from the 
following decreasing progression, by way of the four 
rules: Modus Ponens-Modus Tollens-Denial of the 
Antecedent-Affirmation of the Consequent. The best 
performance was obtained, therefore, when the 
 
 
subjects reasoned about Modus Ponens rules, 
followed by Modus Tollens rules, as is predicted by 
the original and revised version of the Theory of 
Mental Models. 
    For Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne, 1991), these results are due to the fact that, in 
the case of Modus Ponens, the subjects generate the 
correct answer directly from the explicit model that 
they originally elaborate in order to reason. When 
the subjects reason about MP problems they only 
elaborate an explicit and implicit model, that 
represents possible alternative models that are not 
developed at first. From the minor premise of a MP 
argument, the subjects do not need to develop this 
implicit model. Therefore, they will focus their 
attention on the initial explicit model, and from there 
will generate the conclusion immediately. 
    In turn, Modus Tollens is less frequent than 
Modus Ponens, as the conclusion  cannot be directly 
 
 
generated from the explicit model, but instead by 
developing the possible implicit models. Regarding 
the minor premise of MT, reasoning with this rule 
requires the elimination of the explicit model, as the 
subjects cannot reason about a premise that is not 
included in this model. Consequently, they will have 
to develop alternative implicit models. If they make a 
conditional interpretation of the statement, then MT 
will be generated through the elaboration of three 
models, whereas if the subjects interpret the relation 
as biconditional, then two models will be developed. 
In any case, the number of mental models necessary 
in MT is greater than in the MP rule. This implies 
that the load on operative memory will be greater, 
and accordingly, performance will be worse. 
                                             Evans (1993) coincides with Johnson-Laird's 
theory in  predicting a higher frequency of problems 
with Modus Ponens than with Modus Tollens, but he 
considers that in the original version there is no clear 
 
 
explanation of how the models are elaborated, when 
they have to reason about Modus Tollens problems. In 
the revised version of the Theory of Mental Models, 
the author proposes that the subjects start elaborating 
an initial representation, that includes the exhaustive 
representation of the affirmative values, but implicit 
representation of the negative values. According to the 
author, "subjects may draw inferences if either the 
premise is exhaustively represented in the current 
model, or if all models in wich it occurs are explicity 
represented" ("P1" principle, Evans, 1993, p. 7). MP 
inference adjusts to the previous principle, but not 
that of MT. In this sense, MP may be generated 
immediately from the initial representation, as "p" is 
exhaustively represented, but MT is not, as the 
premise "not q" is not totally represented. The 
revised version of the theory also proposes that when 
a subject has to reason about a premise that is not 
included in the explicit model, he or she will try to 
develop an implicit model. However, this may be 
 
 
successful or not, and so may generate the correct 
inference or fail. 
    Similarly, as well as the number of correct logical 
answers, we have used as a dependent variable 
certainty of answer. The greater complexity of 
reasoning with MT and importantly, the greater load 
on operative memory, explain the lesser certainty 
registered in MT with regard to MP. In the same way, 
the non-propositional alternative was selected with 
greater frequency in the MT rule than in the MP. 
This result could be explained within the framework 
of the Theory of Mental Models, bearing in mind that 
in reasoning about a MT the explicit model is 
eliminated, and subjects only have the implicit model 
on hand, that they will have to develop to be able to 
generate the correct inference. However, on 
occasions this model is not developed, with the 
direct conclusion that “it is not possible to deduce 
any conclusion”. In the MP, the percentage of 
 
 
subjects who selected the non-propositional 
alternative is less, as in this case the subjects are 
reasoning directly from the initial explicit model. 
    Our results also show that the MP and MT rules 
were more frequently developed than those of AC 
and DA. These results do not support either of the 
two versions of the theory, according to which the 
MP and AC rules occur more often than those of MT 
and DA. On one hand, the original version of the 
theory predicts the higher occurrence of MP and AC 
with regard to the explicit representation in the 
initial model of the affirmative values, and not of the 
negative. For Evans, the higher frequency of MP and AC 
was due to the fact that: “inferences will be more often 
made if the conditions for inference are met in the 
initial implicit representation and less often if fleshing 
out is required” (P2 principle, formulated by Evans, 
1993, p. 7). 
    Unlike the original version of the theory, which 
 
 
predicts a similar frequency in the production of MP 
and AC, and supporting the prediction of the revised 
version, we registered a higher frequency in the 
production of MP with regard to AC. While Johnson-
Laird and Byrne (1991) justify their prediction by 
pointing out that a conditional may be initially 
represented by a model where “p” is not exhaustively 
represented, for Evans an inference is only produced if 
the premise is exhaustively represented in a model, or 
if all the models have been developed (the P1 principle, 
proposed by the author). For this reason, only MP is 
directly produced, and AC needs to be produced in a 
biconditional interpretation of the statement. 
    The results obtained with the “type of rule” variable 
partially support the Theory of Mental Models, and, 
more so, the revised version of the theory. To sum up: 
a) MP takes place more often than MT, as is proposed 
by both versions, b) MP is more frequent than the AC 
rule, and, in turn, the AC rule is produced with a similar 
 
 
frequency to the DA rule; both results support the 
predictions of the revised version of the theory, and do 
not confirm the predictions of the original version, and 
c) the MP and AC rules are produced more often than 
the MT and DA rules. This prediction, from the two 
versions of the theory, is not confirmed by our results. 
    The results of this investigation confirm our 
empirical expectations regarding the importance of 
knowledge about reasoning, in line with results from 
previous investigations (Valiña and colleagues, 1992a, 
b). We registered a significant interactive effect on the 
number of correct answers between the type of rule and 
probability of empirical occurrence of the statements. 
Thus, just as Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1992); Byrne 
and Johnson-Laird (1992) proposed, the difficulty in 
the production of the four rules of inference is 
modulated by the necessary or probable character of 
the relation which they express. According to the 
authors, when subjects reason about a deontic or 
 
 
necessary relation (which we have called deterministic), 
they only need to elaborate an explicit model of the 
situation to produce the correct inference. However, 
when they reason about a probabilistic relation, they 
have to contemplate at least two alternative 
possibilities, given that the relation may or may not 
occur. Therefore, they will have to elaborate an 
explicit model, from the information mentioned in 
the rule, and an implicit model. 
    The results of our experiment support this 
previous proposal. Effectively, the best performance 
with Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens rules was 
registered with statements which expressed a 
deterministic relation. However, as previously 
shown, with MT problems performance was worse, 
as the structure of the rule means that the subjects are 
not able to reason directly from a single initial explicit 
model. Furthermore, in the Modus Tollens rule, 
worse reasoning was observed with probabilistic 
 
 
relations. In this case, added to the inherent 
difficulties in the formal structure of MT, was the 
fact that the probabilistic relation means that the 
subject had to contemplate various alternative 
models in order to produce the conclusion. 
    Similarly, Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1992, 
experiment 3), observed that the presence of a 
probabilistic modal verb in statements converted the 
relation into a fact that may or may not occur. As a 
consequence, in order to reason, the subjects had to 
elaborate an explicit model (that reveals the event 
occurrence mentioned in the rule) and an implicit 
model (that represents the potential possibility that an 
event may not occur). However, the presence of a 
deontic modal verb indicated to the subjects that there 
was no possible alternative to the event mentioned in 
the statement. In this respect, the determinism in the 
relation guided the subjects towards the construction of 
a single explicit model that expressed the occurrence of 
 
 
the relation. In short, as Byrne and Johnson-Laird 
(1992) pointed out, while a modal verb with a 
probabilistic character requires the elaboration of a 
series of alternative models which are intrinsically 
hypothetical, the modal verb which expresses a relation 
of necessity brings about the construction of a single 
simple factual model. 
    Furthermore, the interactive effect registered 
between the probability of empirical ocurrence and the 
type of rule revealed that in the AC and DA rules, the 
lower the possibility of activating empirical 
knowledge, then performance with both rules was 
more correct. These results may be explained 
through the existence of a bias towards non-
propositional conclusions, that would lead the subject 
towards a correct conclusion. In this respect the 
subjects could be selecting the correct alternative 
simply because the absence of empirical relation  
between the elements of the rule would  lead them to 
 
 
reject the task more often, and, consequently,  to 
point out that it was not possible to come to a 
conclusion. 
    Stevenson and Over (1995, experiment 4), 
analysed the effect of the “quality” of premises on 
the production of the AC and DA rules. The 
authors observed that as the lack of certainty 
increased in the conditional relation, reasoning 
with the AC became difficult, while it had no 
effect upon the DA rule. Our results in the 
“without relation” condition, with AC and DA 
rules, support those of Stevenson and Over. 
Effectively, the lack of empirical relation between 
the antecedent and the consequent make 
performance more difficult with AC rules than 
with DA problems. In general, these authors 
explain their results within the framework of the 
Theory of Mental Models, indicating that: “the 
epistemic weights of mental models of the premises in 
 
 
an inference would help determine the weights of the 
mental models of the conclusion, which would fix how 
probable or improbable the conclusion was thought to 
be” (Stevenson & Over, 1995, p. 640). 
    Similarly, other authors (Cummins, Lubart, 
Alksnis and Rist, 1991) underlined the importance 
of the content of conditional statements on the 
production of inference rules. The authors 
designed an investigation which analysed the 
influence of the form and content of the statements 
on the subjects' reasoning with decontextualised 
conditional arguments. As in our experiment,  the 
authors presented the subjects with problems of 
the four rules of conditional inference, with thematic 
content, that expressed cause-effect relations and 
varied with regard to the number of “alternative 
causes” and “possible causes” that could be 
derived from the conditional. The authors also 
registered an interactive effect between form and 
 
 
content, which lead them to characterise human 
reasoning as a fundamentally pragmatic type of 
reasoning: “the tendency to interpret a statement as 
a conditional or a biconditional may exist on a 
continuum, varying with the size of the pool of 
alternatives that characterize the situation 
described by the conditional” (Cummins, Lubart, 
Alksnis & Rist, 1991, p. 275). 
    If a parallelism is established with the probability  
of empirical occurrence variable which we used, the 
“deterministic” level may be assimilated with the 
condition in which the authors suggest a narrow 
relation between antecedent and consequent, so that there 
are no possible “altemative causes” in the conclusion 
that is presented. On the contrary, it would be possible 
to assimilate the “probabilistic” level with the 
condition where the content of the argument is flexible 
towards the possible existence of “incapacitating 
conditions” that make the presented statement more 
 
 
relative (or probable). In this respect, and according to 
the authors, the greater the number of possible causes 
which the subjects may produce by activating their 
knowledge, then the lesser the probability of the subjects 
making a biconditional interpretation of the statements. 
In conditionals whose consequence is probable, the 
subjects will produce MP and MT rules less often than 
in “deterministic” statements. The AC and DA rules 
will be produced with deterministic statements, as they 
are more interpreted as biconditionals. According to the 
authors, the less “alternative causes” the subject is able 
to elaborate, the better the production of MP, MT, AC 
and DA rules. 
    These authors, in agreement with their own 
predictions, found a similar interactive effect to that 
which we obtained between form and empirical 
frequency. The results of Cummins and colleagues 
(1991) confirm that the type of inference produced is 
modulated by factors related to the activation of 
 
 
knowledge, particularly to the possibility of activating 
“alternative causes” or “incapacitating conditions” 
from the statements. In our case, this influence of 
knowledge upon reasoning was reflected in the possibility 
of activating empirical knowledge from the frequency of 
the statements which were presented. These variables 
determine the search for plausible conclusions 
elaborated from empirical knowledge, and not from 
logical or necessary conclusions, elaborated through 
the activation of formal rules. 
    Moreover, our empirical expectations with regard to 
availability were confirmed. As Evans (1984) 
proposed, availability is not enough to facilitate the 
production of a conditional inference task, as opposed 
to Pollard's (1982) point of view. Our results show that 
the mere inclusion of available professions in 
decontextualised arguments does not improve the 
subjects' performance regarding the inclusion of non-
available professions. However, the subjects' level of 
 
 
certainty in their answers increased. 
    Nonetheless, one of the predictions made regarding 
availability of the scenario was not confirmed. In line 
with Pollard and Evans (1987), where the influence of 
context-content variables on reasoning was 
proposed, we expected to register a significant 
interactive effect between the empirical frequency 
of the statements and availability of the scenario 
where they were included. We hoped to obtain a 
higher number of correct answers and greater 
certainty of answers when the subjects reasoned 
about deterministic relations, presented in 
accessible contexts. Similarly, the worst degree of 
performance and lowest certainty of answer would 
be registered when the subjects reasoned about 
statements “without relation”, in non-avaible 
contexts. However, these predictions were not 




    In spite of this, in the context of this 
experiment, when we refer to “available 
scenarios”, we are simply referring to conditional 
arguments which include available professions. 
Perhaps the way of manipulating this variable and 
the type of task presented may explain the absence 
of significant effects of this factor on correct 
performance. It will be important to undertake 
new investigations in the future to study if the 
effect of this variable on reasoning is greater when 
conditional arguments included in texts are used, 
that allow the subjects to elaborate a “mental 
framework that is actively transformed, with the 
intention of deriving its factual and plausible 
consequences from the "mental simulation" 
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